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Bell: Reply to a Generous Critic

REPLY TO A GENEROUS CRITIC1
PETER A. BELL

The critical points in Professor Pearson's Response which demand some reply are as follows. First, the adoption of the full recovery rule for psychic injury will cause little, if any, change in people's
safety behavior. Secondly, the extension of liability for psychic injury
will result in an undesirable influx of trivial claims.
1. Safety behavior change. My article's instrumentalist 2 approach
to the issue of tort recovery for psychic injury relies heavily on the
view that the full recovery rule would better serve the goal of efficiently reducing the number and severity of accidents than do existing rules. This view in turn-depends on a belief that both liability
and the threat of liability for culpably caused psychic injuries will
cause people to change their behavior in ways which make such accidents less likely to occur. Professor Pearson challenges that belief.3
1. Professor Pearson, in his Response, mixes considerable praise for this author's work in
with his modulated disagreement with the thesis and several of the arguments of my article.
Such kind treatment of a fellow author's important work should demonstrate that there is
little, if any, correlation between one's attitudes towards tort recovery for psychic harm and
one's "involvement in mankinde." See Pearson, Liability for Negligently Inflicted Psychic
Harm: A Response to ProfessorBell, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 413 n.1 (1984). This author's reference
to the John Donne sonnet was meant to emphasize that our culture has long recognized that an
injury to one person occurs not to him alone.
2. While my article discusses the originalist approach to a decision entitling a person to
psychic well-being, it is unabashedly instrumentalist in its discussion of the merits of the full
recovery rule. Professor Pearson's analysis of my article's entitlement section suggests that he
misperceives its main thrust. The instrumentalist and originalist approaches were examined in
order to demonstrate people have a right to their psychic well-being, much as they have a right
to their physical well-being. That discussion was not intended to demonstrate any particular
rules should exist concerning which invasions of that right should result in liability. Cf.
Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle,9 J. LEG. STU. 227, 240-41 (1980)
(relationship between a person's right to his own physical labor and wealth maximization); Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEG. STUD.103, 125-26 (1979) (discussing a person's rights to such basics as his own body and physical labor). Such a preliminary
discussion seemed necessary as this author sensed a feeling that people have no right to any
level of psychic well-being was underlying some of the criticism of recovery for psychic injury.
See, e.g., Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv.L. REv.
1033, 1035 (1936). See also Aquilio v. Nelson, 78 A.D.2d 195, 434 N.Y.S.2d 520 (4th Dept.
1980). In Aquilio, the court denied a mother recovery for mental and emotional harm caused by
the negligent obstetrical care of defendants. The negligence resulted in the death of her infant
after one day of life. The court stated: "The risk of indirect harm from the loss or injury of
loved ones is pervasive and inevitably realized at one time or another. Only a very small part of
that risk is brought about by the culpable acts of others. This is the risk of living and bearing
children." Id. at 199, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 523.
3. Professor Pearson introduces his discussion of my accident cost reduction arguments
by saying- "It is unlikely in the extreme that the law relating to damages for emotional harm
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The belief that a full recovery rule would result in behavior
changes reducing the number of psychic injuries rests upon two effects emanating from tort liability rules. First, these rules create an
incentive not to engage in certain behavior by increasing the cost of
such behavior. Second, by making the statement that culpable actors
must pay for the psychic injuries they cause, the law will make actors
generally more aware of the potential for such injuries and, therefore,
increase the probability that those actors will act in ways which minimize the chance of such injuries. While neither effect can be accurately measured to determine how extensively changes behavior, 4 reasons do exist to believe that the behavior-changing effects would be
significant.
The most obvious reason is the belief rational actors will prefer to
spend their scarce resources for safety measures rather than pay out
more in such resources for psychic injuries.5 For example, a company
such as Union Carbide would be willing to spend more money on
back-up safety systems to avoid potential gas leaks if it knew that it
would have to pay x + y thousand dollars should the gas leak than if
it would only have to pay x thousand dollars in the event of the leak.'
will have any impact on how people behave." Pearson, supra note 1, at 417.
4. There have been few attempts to assess empirically the deterrent effects of tort rules.
The noteworthy studies which have taken place recently have sought to analyze the effects of
tort rules which ostensibly set out new requirements that members of a particular class of professionals behave in a particular way. Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality:
An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 443 [hereinafter cited as
Givelber]; Robertson, Informed Consent in Canada: An Empirical Study, 22 OSGOODE HALL
L.J. 139 (1984); Wiley, The Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 345 (1981). Even those studies were somewhat equivocal in their
conclusions about the behavior-changing impact of the decisions they examined. In addition,
they disagreed about the interpretation of the data collected in the earlier study. See Givelber,
supra, at 489 n.131. It will be a very difficult task indeed for scholars to provide satisfactory
empirical answers to the far more complex question of whether, and to what extent, changes in
tort rules which simply increase the damage awards associated with already culpable conduct
will cause changes in that conduct.
5. The second effect, the actors' increased awareness of the psychic injuries which their
conduct risks, is much more difficult to define and apparently impossible to measure. While
that may provide reason not to discuss it at length, it does not suggest that the effect is unimportant. Cf., e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 24-26 (1970) (the author explains why
he will not discuss justice at length). If tort law permits psychically injured persons to recover
damages, it can be expected that more such injured persons will make public the psychic injuries caused by various kinds of culpable conduct. This would occur through simply making a
public record through litigation. The law's recognition of the validity of those claims can be
expected to shape other social actors' views of the importance and likelihood of such injuries.
The resulting changes will affect the internal inhibitions of people against engaging in conduct
causing psychic injury. Cf., e.g., Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical
Malpractice:Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 939,
977-79 (1984) (sanction of tort liability for medical malpractice may influence doctors and lead
to evaluation of a treatment's moral aspects and risk to patients).
6. Based on this view, one would expect to find that the Union Carbide Corporation had
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How much more the company would be willing to spend on safety
would, of course, depend on how big y was likely to be. In other
words, the full recovery rule will increase the expected costs associated with certain behavior by adding the expected
cost of psychic
7
injury onto the expected cost of physical injury.
The extent such an addition to expected costs will inspire changes
in behavior depends on three factors: (1) the magnitude of the expected psychic injury costs; (2) the cost of making the change necessary to avoid the injury-causing accident; and (3) the ability of the
prospective defendant to perceive the alternative behavior, the expected costs of not adopting it, and the relationship between the two.
As to the first factor, the expected psychic injury costs will be substantial, either because the plaintiff's injury will be severe or because
there will be several plaintiffs- In instances where the full recovery
rule would operate to modify the ensuing physical injury rule,
psychic injury costs will be the main deterrent.
With respect to the second factor, there is simply no way to know
what the defendant's accident avoidance costs will be. One can confidently assume that in some instances they will be such that the
threat of liability for physical injuries alone will be enough to persuade perspective defendants to make the change. Instances will also
spent more on accident prevention or reduction measures at its Institute, West Virginia, plant
than the company had spent at its Bhopal, India, plant before December 3, 1984. On that date,
a large quantity of methyl isocyanate escaped into the air at the latter plant, killing and seriously injuring thousands. In fact, the only two early complaints filed in United States courts
which this author has seen both alleged that Union Carbide failed to install a computerized
early warning system at its Bhopal plant as it had in its West Virginia plant. Dawani v. Union
Carbide Corp., No. 84-2479 (S.D.W.Va., filed Dec. 7, 1984), Class Action Complaint and Jury
Demand at 7, 21(G); Wilson v. Union Carbide Corp., No. B 84 792WWE (D. Conn., fied Dec.
13, 1984), Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at 6, %21(G) (copies of complaints on file
with author).
7. The familiar Learned Hand negligence formula determines liability by asking whether
B < P x L. Under this formula, B is the burden on the defendant of avoiding the accident, P is
the probability that the accident will occur if the defendant does not take steps to avoid it, and
L is the average damages which will result if the accident occurs. See, e.g., R. PosNR, TORT
LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYsis 1-3 (1982). Permitting full recovery for psychic injury will
increase the L in the above equation, the loss expected if an accident occurs.
8. The oft-stated fears about the crushing burden of liability which would result if recovery for psychic injury were more liberally permitted suggest many think psychic injury costs
will be substantial. See Bell, The Bell Tolls: Toward Full Tort Recovery for Psychic Injury, 36
U. FLA. L. REv. 333, 347 (1984) [hereinafter cited as The Bell Tolls]. The reasons stated in my
article as to why psychic injury liability probably will not be crushing do not suggest the costs
will be insubstantial. Id. at 347-91. Professor Pearson is correct to point to my recitation of the
California insurance experience as casting doubt on the substantiality of psychic injury liability
costs. Id. at 366-67 (one insurer ascribed no premium rate increase to psychic injury awards).
The insurer's report of a paucity of psychic injury claims may reflect how far California really is
from a full recovery rule. It may also reflect, as does the failure to break psychic injury claims
out separately, that psychic injury costs tend to get lumped in with physical injury costs much
the same way pain and suffering are considered part of physical injury costs by insurers.
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occur where the expected psychic and physical injury costs together
will not be greater than the accident avoidance costs. If so, no change
in safety behavior will result from either the existing rules or the full
recovery rule. There will be instances, however, in which the costs of
avoiding an accident are greater than expected liability for physical
injuries, but less than the expected liability costs for both physical
and psychic injuries.9 It is in these last situations that the full recovery rule will cause behavior change.
It would be surprising if these last situations occurred infrequently. Actors usually have many safety steps of varying costs available to them. As was noted above, psychic injury liability costs often
will be substantial. Additionally, many actors operate in an environment in which the injuries they risk will have psychic components
greater than their physical components." As a result, there should be
many instances- in which the incremental increase in expected liability costs resulting from the full recovery rule makes it worthwhile to
take safety steps which avoid at least some psychic injuries.
Of course, as Professor Pearson points out," expected behavior
change may not occur in those above-described situations if actors do
not accurately perceive the possible psychic injury liability resulting
from their culpable conduct. Behavior change may also not occur if
actors fail to perceive the relationship between increased safety behavior and a lessening of expected psychic injury liability costs. Professor Pearson suggests that the prevalence of nonrational decisionmaking and the public's general ignorance of rules regarding tort
recovery for psychic injury means actors rarely have that perceptive
ability. 1 2 While Professor Pearson is correct in believing the threat of
9. This will obviously be so in instances in which liability is based on strict liability. It
will also be true in instances where liability is premised on negligence. In determining whether
a defendant's conduct was unreasonable under the circumstances, a jury will not be likely to
factor into that determination the likely psychic costs of a defendant's behavior unless it has
been permitted to hear evidence concerning and instructed to award damages for the psychic
injury actually inflicted. Therefore, there will be some instances in which a defendant will not
even be found negligent if psychic injury damages are not awarded, whereas he would be found
liable under the full recovery rule. In addition, one must not ignore the fact that much of an
actor's information concerning the likely liability costs of his behavior comes to him through his
liability insurance premium rates. Insurance premium rates, which would not prevent actors
from engaging in certain activities if they reflected only physical injury costs, would keep some
of those actors away from such activities if they reflected psychic injury costs as well.
10. For example, consider the situation faced by actors whose work brings them into regular contact with children. If they faced liability to parents for psychic injury resulting from
harm which occurred to a child, it is unimaginable that day-care center operators, school bus
manufacturers and the like would not spend more to avoid children-harming accidents than
they now do. Cf., e.g., Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government
Regulation, 33 VAND. L. REv. 1281, 1293-95 (1980).
11. See Pearson, supra note 1, at 417.
12. Id. at 417-18.
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liability for psychic injuries will not change nonrational behavior, he
may overestimate the extent to which that factor would interfere
with the behavior-changing properties of the full recovery rule. As a
perusal of any collection of tort cases would reveal,1 most tortiously
caused psychic injuries probably involve the conduct of institutional
actors. They constitute just the sort of rational decisionmakers likely
to be influenced by expected liability costs. 14 The culpable conduct of
institutional actors holds the potential for much more widespread
psychic injury than does that of individuals. Even such archetypal,
nonrational conduct as negligent driving may leave room for rational
decisionmaking about safety. For example, the higher insurance rates
occasioned by the full recovery rule may deter some persons from
purchasing an automobile. Alternatively, the potentially increased
costs of liability for traffic accidents may either deter a car owner
from frequent driving or discourage driving at times when accidents
are more likely to occur, such as in bad weather.
As stated previously, Professor Pearson is also concerned that full
recovery for psychic injury would not change behavior because most
persons do not know about psychic injury recovery rules, particularly
those rules affecting bystander recovery. This concern also seems a
small obstacle to the full recovery rule's significant safety impact. Regardless of the extent to which people are familiar with current
psychic injury liability rules, they are much more likely to be familiar
with the full recovery rule, which is both simpler and less counterintuitive. Actors will be aware of potential liability for culpably caused
psychic injuries to the same extent they are aware of potential liability for physical injuries. Besides, an actor need not be aware of any
particular rules in order to be influenced by liability. He need only be
aware of the expected costs of his behavior. In many instances, that
information will come from past experience with liability payouts on
the part of either the actor or a third party. 5 The full recovery rule,
with its addition of psychic injury liability costs, will make such
payouts larger. Accordingly, actors will get the message that the costs
13. See, e.g., 27 ATLA LAW REPORTER 434-77 (Dec. 1984) (of 120 cases listed, 100 involved one or more institutional defendants. Most of the 20 cases against individual defendants
involved injuries arising from what Professors Pearson and Rodgers would regard as rational
behavior).
14. See, e.g., Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory,
54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 6, 11-15 (1980).
15. The messages concerning expected liability costs often come in the form of liability
insurance rates. Those rates usually will be based on past liability experience of the insured or
similar actors. They may also reflect discounts or surcharge for insureds who take certain safety
measures or who engage in particularly risky practices. See, e.g., Interagency Task Force on
Product Liability, I Product Liability- Final Report of the Insurance Study 1-18 to 1-24, 1-30
(U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1977).
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of certain behavior can be expected to be greater than it once was.
2. Influx of trivial claims. Admittedly, insignificant psychic injury
claims present a less compelling case for recovery than do other
claims. My article nevertheless concludes that it would be preferable
to institute the full recovery rule in its unadulterated form. 16 Professor Pearson apparently views the likelihood of a substantial number
of trivial claims for psychic injuries as sufficiently greater than the
full recovery rule should be rejected. 17 His treatment of this point
suggests that we differ because of both our different perceptions of
what claims are "trivial" and our different conclusions about the extent to which psychic injury claims will be brought under the full
recovery rule.
While these differences should not be ignored, it may be more important for the reader to recognize the foundational areas of agreement between this author's article and Professor Pearson's response.
That agreement occurs principally about why trivial claims might be
undesirable in tort law: namely, because it may cost more to resolve
such claims than their resolution benefits society.18 It also occurs in
Professor Pearson's willingness to consider a pre-set dollar threshold
requirement for recovery for psychic injury as a solution to the trivial
claims threat. 9
16. See The Bell Tolls, supra note 8, at 382-91. The "adulterated" version of the rule
which I mention therein would deduct a set amount, such as $500, from the recovery received
for psychic injury by any plainiff. See id. at 390.
17. Professor Pearson rearticulates in his Response his long-held view that most psychic
injury cases are trivial and that this presents a serious obstacle to any enlargement of recovery
for such harm. See Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional
Harm - A Comment on the Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 507-12 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Liability to Bystanders].
18. In articulating this as the major concern he has with trivial claims, Professor Pearson
colors the danger that claim processing costs will outweigh benefits by describing the resulting
loss shifting as occurring among people "most of whom at one time or another are both victims
and inflicters of negligently inflicted emotional harm." Pearson, supra note 1, at 426. My article
explains why this echo of George Fletcher's idea concerning reciprocal risks should not lead to a
restriction of recovery for psychic injury. The Bell Tolls, supra note 8, at 383-84 and accompanying text. In evaluating Professor Pearson's conclusions concerning the need to foreclose trivial claims, one should remember he has what this author regards as an unduly narrow view of
the positive effects of damages for psychic injury in reducing the number and severity of accidents. See supra notes 3-15 and accompanying text. Accordingly, he is much more likely to
view the costs of processing any sort of psychic injury claim as outweighing the benefits of the
claim.
19. See Pearson, supra note 1, at 429. While he admits that this author's deductible approach would eliminate trivial claims if the deductible were a higher amount, Professor Pearson
shies away from endorsing it because it is unlikely to be implemented. Id. It would admittedly
be unusual for courts to set out a definite dollar floor for plaintiff recovery of psychic injury
damages. It is, however, within the courts' power to do so. Because such an approach is far
preferable, for the reasons outlined in my article, to the sort of "serious emotional distress"
floor which many courts around the country have been adopting, it does not seem farfetched to
believe that some courts might be willing to adopt the deductible approach.
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Our principle disagreement seems to be concerning the likelihood
that many claims for trivial psychic injury will be brought if the full
recovery rule is adopted. This disagreement may have something to
do with our different senses of what is trivial, as Professor Pearson
suggests, but it seems to go further than that. Even in the unlikely
event psychic injury claims generating $2500 in damages would be
generally regarded as trivial,2 0 few would be litigated. At even a forty
percent contingency fee, such a claim would generate only $1000 for
an attorney. Representation of such psychically injured persons
would be financially feasible only if such cases were settled. The
same would probably be true for the client as well. Indeed, attorney's
fees, costs, disbursements, and the necessity for some kind of expert
examination and testimony 21 would probably reduce the client's net
recovery from even a successful lawsuit to significantly less than
$1000. Of course, if one were to think of trivial psychic injury as one
for which a jury would award considerably less than $2500 in damages, then it is even more unlikely such claims will be litigated.
Professor Pearson suggests in a footnote to his analysis of this point that a threshold,
rather than a deductible, approach would be preferable. Pearson, supra note 1, at 429 n.83. I
agree. In line with the $500 figure mentioned in discussing the deductible approach in my article, the threshold approach would work in the following manner. If the plaintiff recovered more
than $500 for his psychic injuries, he would receive the full damages awarded. If the fact-finder
awarded him $500 or less for his psychic injuries, he would get nothing for those injuries. The
jury would not be told in advance of the threshold figure. Like the deductible approach, this
threshold approach would leave the decision about the seriousness of his injury in the hands
the plaintiff and his lawyer, the persons best able to evaluate how serious the psychic injury
could be shown to be.
20. Although the $2500 figure is the only one which Professor Pearson discusses as a denominator of trivial claims, in contrast to the $500 figure offered in my article, even he seems
unwilling to term a psychic injury with such damage value trivial. See Pearson, supra note 1, at
427. Instead, Professor Pearson suggests that the $2500 figure represents a generalized legislative judgment that persons should be willing to suffer $2500 worth of intangible harm without
compensation. Id. The legislative actions from which Professor Pearson infers such a generalized judgment, however, imply no such thing. Those actions are particular parts of legislation
which replaced the tort system with a no-fault system for automobile accidents. The legislative
judgment being expressed by the $775 threshold to which Professor Pearson refers is a judgment that potential automobile accident victims should give up something (the change to obtain larger damages, including damages for pain and suffering, in a tort suit) in order to get
something (the assurance that they will be compensated at least to some extent without the
need to go through litigation and without regard to the fault of the actors). Dollar thresholds
adopted as part of that give-up-to-get process hardly represent a judgment that people should
be willing to accept, and that actors should be free to inflict, psychic injuries so serious that a
jury would award a victim $2500.
21. It seems likely that cases sufficiently close to litigate will require the plaintiff to present some expert medical testimony if he is to prevail on a psychic injury claim. See The Bell
Tolls, supra note 8, at 352-53. Such a requirement, which might be even more strongly felt
where a real question exists concerning whether the claim is "trivial," will make the case more
complex than the normal tort case and thus may make it even less likely that $1000 will adequately encourage an attorney to try the case.

4f
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Professor Pearson doubts the efficacy of this self-screening process in limiting trivial claims, but supports that doubt only with the
observation that small claims may be worth pursuing for their settlement value.2 2 Assuming that such cases could be settled, 23 my concerns about trivial claims diminish and perhaps disappear, as should
Professor Pearson's. When a case is settled, its transaction costs to
society are much smaller than if it is litigated. 24 Therefore, the deterrent benefits of even small claim settlements are likely to outweigh
the social costs of arriving at that result. Most of the costs of settling
claims are private costs in that, public resources, in the form of court
time, are only minimally consumed. Accordingly, the parties' decisions concerning whether the amount of the settlement is worth the
costs of the settlement process are likely to represent the best judgment concerning the relative costs and benefits of the process.
More importantly, Professor Pearson's response offers no evidence
in support of his belief that many or most psychic injury claims are
trivial. Indeed, in his previous article, he admitted he had no proof
that "most cases of negligently inflicted emotional harm would be
trivial. ' 25 This is important because if few of the psychic injury
22. Professor Pearson also challenges the efficacy of self-screening by challenging this author's observation that there has been no great number of trivial claims brought for intentionally inflicted harms where tort law has long permitted claims for nominal damages. Pearson,
supra note 1, at 428. He explains this by suggesting that the absence of liability insurance for
intentional tort claims may make such claims not worth pursuing. It seems that it is precisely
the small claims which would be worth pursuing in such instances because most potential defendants would be able to afford to pay a small damage award out of their own pockets.
23. In cases where it is not worth the attorney's or plaintiff's time and effort to litigate to
conclusion, defendants have an interest in making plaintiffs believe that they will not settle. In
many psychic injury cases, the defendant or the real party in interest, an insurer, will be an
institution which is exposed to many trivial claims. Accordingly, in any one case, it may be
worthwhile to the defendant to pay more in litigation costs than a suit is worth rather than to
settle because the defendant will benefit by getting a reputation for refusal to settle. Such a
reputation will discourage future trivial claims against it.
24. See The Bell Tolls, supra note 8,at 379 n.181 (costs of settled cases average $200-393,
while costs of litigated cases average $2,790-8,649).
25. Liability to Bystanders, supra note 17, at 509 n.177. Professor Pearson doubts
whether empirical proof on either side of the question can be found. Id. This author's article
sets forth reasons why the conclusion quoted in the text is probably erroneous. The Bell Tolls,
supra note 8, at notes 220-23 and accompanying text. There are some indications in the response that Professor Pearson is less sure than he once was that there will be many trivial
claims. He seems to feel the need to argue the unimportance of whether there will be a flood of
trivial claims. Pearson, supra note 1, at 428.
There are other indications Professor Pearson still fears the flood, particularly in his
lengthy recitation of examples about our oversensitive society taken from a Time magazine
essay. Pearson, supra note 1, at 420-21. Unlike Professor Pearson, this author does not perceive
ours as an overly sensitive society. Rather this author perceives a society in which racial and
ethnic minorities, women, gays, and even fat people, increasingly have been willing to speak
openly about the hurts which they have endured in the past less noisily, albeit not less painfully. A society, such as ours, in which severe reductions in public aid to the less fortunate and
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claims brought under the full recovery rule would be trivial, then the
rule's benefits in receiving psychic injury would outweigh whatever
excess transaction costs resulted from the occasional trivial claims.
Like Professor Pearson, I have not uncovered hard evidence demonstrating the likelihood that few trivial psychic injury lawsuits would
arise, although I have shown both here and in my main article reasons why it is unlikely that there will be many such claims. There is
ample evidence, however, that the present restrictive rules governing
tort recovery for psychic injury exclude from the courts many persons
who have been seriously injured psychically by the culpable conduct
of another. Insofar as the prospect of trivial claims is responsible for
the rules which bar recovery in such cases, the rule should be rejected. The elimination of harm which we know is occurring is preferable when such elimination merely creates a possibility other harm
will occur. 26 This preference should be particularly strong where, as is

the case with the full recovery rule, the new legal rule can be modified if necessary to eliminate the problem of trivial claims.
In conclusion, it is important to emphasize that Professor Pearson's principal objections to the adoption of the full recovery rule lie
in his views about the injury-reducing effects of the rule and the danger of a substantial influx of trivial claims. As this reply indicates,
such a danger need not inevitably materialize. I hope others who
have read this interchange of ideas with as open a mind as Professor
Pearson read my article will find my arguments sufficiently persuasive to give the full recovery rule a working chance.

some increases in expenditures on tools for human destruction are as popular as they were
during the first term of the Reagan presidency, displays undersensitivity to misfortune, not
oversensitivity.
26. Of course, such a preference would not exist if the expected costs of the risked harm
were, because of its high probability of occurrence and/or its grave consequences, greater than
the certain costs of the known harm. Such is not the case here.
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